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RESEARCH ARTICLE
The Disintegration of the Military 
Integration Process in South Sudan  
(2006–2013)
Lesley Anne Warner
This article argues that military integration served a critical purpose in 2006, 
arguably preventing large-scale conflict within South Sudan and ensuring a level 
of stability prior to the CPA-mandated referendum on self-determination in 2011. 
Nonetheless, integration was poorly-conceived and implemented, and received lim-
ited support from third party actors that were more focused on rightsizing the 
SPLA and transforming it into a conventional, professional military. The de facto 
open-door nature of South Sudan’s integration process created incentives for 
armed rebellion, while failed rightsizing initiatives increased pressure on the mili-
tary integration process as the most expedient way of mitigating the threat these 
groups posed to stability. Integration thus became an end in and of itself rather 
than a transitional measure to contain former combatants while the government 
worked out a more long-term solution for South Sudan’s security sector. Conse-
quently, the SPLA was in a state of arrested development, preventing efforts to 
transform the military from gaining traction, and making the force more likely to 
fragment along factional lines during periods of heightened political competition.
Introduction1
Since its inception in 1983, the Sudan 
People’s Liberation Army (SPLA) had been 
integrating other rebel groups operating in 
what was then southern Sudan during the 
Second Sudanese Civil War (1983–2005). 
Even so, by the time the Comprehensive 
Peace Agreement (CPA) was signed end-
ing the war with the Government of Sudan, 
over 50,000 men were members of up to 
50 armed groups that included rivals to the 
SPLA, which came to comprise the military 
of South Sudan (Young 2006; ICG 2006). 
Faced with both legal and practical impera-
tives to address non-SPLA armed groups, the 
Government of South Sudan could either 
attempt to fight them, accept that it did not 
possess a monopoly on the use of force in the 
South,2 or attempt to reach a political-mili-
tary accommodation with them. For the most 
part, the government chose to accommo-
date armed groups, formalized through the 
Juba Declaration on Unity and Integration 
in January 2006, which granted these 
groups amnesty for all war-related activities 
in exchange for their loyalty to the govern-
ment and integration into the SPLA (“Juba 
Declaration” GRSS 2006). Through military 
integration, the SPLA thus became the pri-
mary vehicle for political-military accommo-
dation in South Sudan (Hutton 2014).
This article examines the role of military 
integration during what was supposed to be 
stability
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South Sudan’s transition from war to peace, 
culminating in the outbreak of civil war in 
December 2013. The insights herein are 
based on interviews with current and former 
SPLA officers, Ministry of Defense officials, 
United Nations officials, and consultants on 
South Sudan’s security sector, conducted 
between August 2012 and December 2014. 
This article argues that military integration 
served a critical purpose in 2006, arguably 
preventing large-scale conflict within South 
Sudan and ensuring a level of stability prior 
to the CPA-mandated referendum on self-
determination in 2011. Nonetheless, integra-
tion was poorly-conceived and implemented 
and received limited support from third party 
actors that were more focused on rightsizing 
the SPLA and transforming it into a conven-
tional, professional military. The de facto 
open-door nature of South Sudan’s integra-
tion process created incentives for armed 
rebellion, while failed rightsizing initiatives 
increased pressure on the military integra-
tion process as the most expedient way of 
mitigating the threat these groups posed to 
stability. Integration thus became an end in 
and of itself rather than a transitional meas-
ure to contain former combatants while the 
government worked out a more long-term 
solution for South Sudan’s security sector. 
Consequently, the SPLA was in a state of 
arrested development, preventing efforts to 
transform the military from gaining traction 
and making the force more likely to frag-
ment along factional lines during periods of 
heightened political competition.
Context of Military Integration in 
South Sudan
Military integration is a peace-building 
strategy in which armed groups are incor-
porated or amalgamated into a statutory 
security framework (Licklider 2014; Hoddie 
and Hartzell 2003; Glassmyer and Sambanis 
2008; Knight 2009; Colletta 2012). Employed 
during transitions from war to peace, it is a 
process that can be an outcome of a nego-
tiated settlement following a political/
military defeat or a stalemate (Colletta 2012; 
Knight 2009). Military integration is often 
utilized in conjunction with political power-
sharing arrangements in which political posi-
tions, such as ministerial posts and seats in 
the legislature, are distributed in the after-
math of a conflict (Glassmyer and Sambanis 
2008; Hoddie and Hartzell 2003). While it is 
distinct from disarmament, demobilization, 
and reintegration (DDR), military integra-
tion can take place prior to, or even con-
current to DDR, as well as the provision of 
livelihoods opportunities and broader social, 
political, and economic assistance to former 
combatants (Hall 2009). Generally, the pro-
cess includes negotiation, cantonment and 
verification of parade, fitness screening, rank 
assignment, and division assignment.
In practice, military integration in South 
Sudan was not a particularly standardized 
process; there was no clear strategy or guide-
lines for how armed groups should be inte-
grated.3 This may have been attributed to 
the fact that between 2006 and 2013, South 
Sudan faced concurrent and competing 
imperatives in its governance, economic, and 
security sectors, and arguably had limited 
bandwidth to design and implement a mili-
tary integration process that would address 
the threat posed by armed groups.4
Between 2005 and 2006, the SPLA was 
transitioning from a non-salaried, ad hoc 
guerrilla army into a more conventional 
force with military formations (Rands 2010). 
Further complicating this transition was 
that there were three statutory military 
forces in Sudan/South Sudan – the Sudan 
Armed Forces (SAF), the SPLA, and the Joint 
Integrated Units (JIUs).5 Per the CPA, there 
was to be a formal process of military integra-
tion between the SAF and the SPLA, and the 
JIUs were intended to demonstrate national 
unity and serve as a nucleus of a future 
national army should South Sudan vote for 
unity over independence in 2011.6 However, 
JIUs were characterized more by the colloca-
tion of SAF and SPLA troops than by their 
true integration, which was unsurprising 
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given the expectation that South Sudan 
would indeed vote for independence in 2011 
(Sudan HSBA 2008a).
The CPA had ended half a century of civil 
war in Sudan but there remained concerns 
that the agreement was merely a ceasefire, 
prompting South Sudan to remain on war-
time footing. Indeed, skirmishes along their 
common border in the spring of 2012 raised 
concerns that a new conflict would erupt. The 
security environment was continually non-
permissive in the Greater Upper Nile region, 
which witnessed multiple instances of ethnic 
conflict and cattle-raiding, the SPLA’s fight to 
disarm the White Army militia in 2006, and 
a succession of Khartoum-supported armed 
groups in 2010 and 2011.
There was a six-year Interim Period of 
the peace agreement (2005–2011), dur-
ing which the CPA’s protocols would need 
to be implemented in cooperation with 
the government in Khartoum. After dec-
ades of marginalization, South Sudan also 
had to create structures and procedures 
to govern the autonomous region that it 
had been granted in the CPA and prepare 
governing institutions in case the region’s 
citizens voted for independence in the 2011 
referendum. Complicating matters, South 
Sudan shut down oil production for several 
months in 2012 due to disagreements with 
the Government of Sudan regarding oil pipe-
line transit fees. For an economy that was 
98 percent dependent on oil revenues, 
this meant that many of the processes that 
required financing, including military inte-
gration, were short of funding.
Military Integration Disintegrates
In December 2013, South Sudan’s military 
integration process faced its most serious 
challenge, as a political crisis that had been 
developing throughout the year within the 
ruling Sudan People’s Liberation Movement 
(SPLM) suddenly escalated, dragging the 
country into civil war. In July of that year, 
President Salva Kiir issued Republican 
Decrees 50/2013 and 51/2013, dismissing 
all ministers and deputy ministers, respec-
tively, in effect sacking his entire cabinet 
(HSBA for Sudan and South Sudan 2014b). 
Included in this effort to marginalize poten-
tial challengers within the SPLM was Kiir’s 
Vice President, Riek Machar. With Machar 
having attempted to wrest control of the 
Sudan People’s Liberation Army (SPLA) by 
force during the Second Sudanese Civil War, 
many feared that his dismissal might cata-
lyze a new rebellion – this time against the 
government of a newly-independent South 
Sudan. However, Machar, who had spent the 
past decade since returning to the SPLM/A 
attempting to repair his tarnished image and 
promote himself as a potential successor to 
Kiir, accordingly chose to try to gain power 
through legitimate means.
With the SPLM’s powerful brand as libera-
tion-movement-turned-political party, politi-
cal competition occurred within a de facto 
one-party state, thereby making a fight within 
the ruling party a fight for national power (The 
Sudd Institute 2014). Therefore, throughout 
the remainder of the year, Machar and other 
prominent members of the SPLM, whom the 
President had marginalized, continued their 
attempts to unseat him as party Chairman. 
Their calculus was that by replacing Kiir as 
Chairman of the SPLM through internal party 
mechanisms, the new party leader would, 
according to the SPLM constitution, become 
the party’s presidential candidate in the 2015 
elections and would then become the next 
president of South Sudan by default.
In November, Kiir announced, and later 
retracted, his intention to dissolve all politi-
cal structures of the SPLM other than the 
Chairman’s office, thus threatening the polit-
ical futures of former party insiders (The Sudd 
Institute 2014). On December 6, senior SPLM 
leaders who had been sacked by the presi-
dent held a press conference calling for the 
long-delayed meeting of the SPLM Political 
Bureau to be held to discuss differences 
over the management of the party (HSBA for 
Sudan and South Sudan 2014b). These indi-
viduals subsequently boycotted the meeting 
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of the SPLM’s National Liberation Council 
(NLC) on December 14 and 15, protesting 
that the meeting had not been delayed to 
allow additional time for dialogue. Suspicious 
that a Machar-led, SPLA-supported coup was 
imminent, Kiir reportedly ordered the disar-
mament of the Presidential Guards, some of 
whom included the personal forces of his for-
mer Vice President.
During disarmament on the evening of 
December 15, fighting erupted between 
Dinka and Nuer members of the Presidential 
Guard, allegedly over selective disarmament, 
and quickly spread to SPLA Headquarters at 
Bilpam. The following day, Kiir announced 
on national television that Machar had 
attempted a coup. While Machar escaped 
Juba, eleven senior political leaders were 
detained and accused of complicity in the 
coup attempt. Within days, Nuer elements of 
SPLA Division 8 in Jonglei state, Division 4 in 
Unity state, and Division 7 in southern Upper 
Nile state had defected and formed an armed 
opposition – the Sudan People’s Liberation 
Movement-in-Opposition (SPLM-IO) (HSBA 
for Sudan and South Sudan 2014a). These 
units had been comprised of armed groups, 
such as the South Sudan Defense Force 
(SSDF), that had been integrated into the 
SPLA following the Juba Declaration nearly 
eight years prior (Johnson 2014; The Sudd 
Institute 2014). Many of the original SPLM-IO 
commanders and the men they led could also 
trace their lineage to the SAF or to Anyanya II; 
the latter had fought the SPLA in the 1980s 
for control of the southern rebellion (Young 
2015). By February 2014, South Sudan’s par-
liament estimated that up to 70 percent of 
the SPLA had defected to the opposition 
(Sudan Tribune 2014).
Why South Sudan Pursued Military 
Integration
Despite the fact that the catalyst of violence 
in December 2013 was a political dispute 
within the SPLM, the subsequent fragmen-
tation of the SPLA may imply that military 
integration was the wrong approach in 
South Sudan. On the contrary, by allowing 
South Sudan to temporarily overcome its 
history of factionalism and ethnic conflict in 
order to consolidate political-military power, 
integration contributed to a marked decline 
in insecurity during the Interim Period of 
the CPA (De Waal 2014; Young 2012). More 
importantly, the military integration process 
averted a potential civil war in the South 
and ensured that the region remained stable 
enough for the referendum on self-determi-
nation to be held, thus paving the way for 
South Sudan’s independence from Sudan 
in 2011 (Young 2012; LeRiche and Arnold 
2012). By reducing the manpower avail-
able for armed groups, the Government of 
South Sudan limited the extent to which the 
Government of Sudan could use its support 
of non-SPLA armed groups in the South to 
undermine CPA implementation and derail 
the referendum on self-determination (ICG 
2006; De Waal 2014). Outbidding Khartoum 
to purchase the loyalties of armed groups in 
the South appeared to have been success-
ful for some period of time, as members of 
Sudan’s ruling party had complained that 
they had been priced out of the market (De 
Waal 2014).
While the CPA had secured peace between 
its signatories – the National Congress Party 
(NCP) in the North and the Sudan People’s 
Liberation Movement/Army (SPLM/A) in 
the South – it left much unresolved. It did 
not address divisions within the South that 
were tied to competitions over leadership 
of the southern rebellion; perceptions of 
ethnic marginalization between the Dinka 
and the Nuer; or personal animosities 
towards SPLM/A leader John Garang’s style 
of leadership and his conceptualization of 
the SPLM/A as a revolution aimed at trans-
forming a united “New Sudan” through the 
replacement of the ruling NCP (formerly the 
National Islamic Front) regime in Khartoum 
with a secular, democratically elected 
government.7
Amid these contentious divisions, non-
SPLA armed groups – such as the South 
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Sudan Defense Force and local self-defense 
militias, referred to in the CPA as Other 
Armed Groups (OAGs) – were required by 
the CPA’s Protocol on Security Arrangements 
and Agreement on Permanent Ceasefire and 
Security Arrangements to either be incor-
porated into the security forces of Sudan 
or South Sudan (i.e. Army, Police, Prisons, 
and Wildlife) or be reintegrated into the 
civil service and civil society institutions 
(CPA 2003; CPA 2004). Like many OAGs, the 
SSDF had been excluded from the peace 
process, yet possessed the size, weapons, 
military capabilities, and strategic locations 
to become spoilers and may have controlled 
up to 20  percent of the territory of South 
Sudan – including some of the areas vital 
to oil production (Young 2006).8 Although 
Garang had stated the SPLM’s willingness 
to integrate the non-SPLA armed groups 
into the security sector and the civil service, 
or to allow them to participate in the DDR 
process, the issue of accommodating armed 
groups had limited traction until after his 
death in July 2005 – possibly due to diver-
gences as to how integration would work in 
practice (Garang 2005).
Given the civil war-era divisions in the 
South, political-military power-sharing was 
a means by which to signal a genuine com-
mitment to peace and a willingness to com-
promise. After Garang’s death, Kiir held a 
series of informal meetings with SSDF lead-
ership in Khartoum in August 2005 to indi-
cate his willingness to reach accommodation 
between the SSDF and the SPLM/A (Young 
2006). He subsequently appointed several 
SSDF members as ministers, commission-
ers, and members of regional assemblies and 
state legislatures (Young 2006). By bring-
ing OAGs into the governing structures of 
the South, the Government of South Sudan 
was allowing these armed groups an ‘insur-
ance policy’ to help assuage fears about their 
role in the post-CPA South. Integrating them 
into the SPLA through the subsequent Juba 
Declaration offered them a mutually rein-
forcing power-sharing arrangement that was 
arguably necessary due to the exclusion of 
OAGs from the CPA negotiations. While the 
CPA was popular in the South, its protocols in 
fact stipulated the dissolution of OAGs, and 
these groups accordingly had to find a way 
to mitigate their isolation from the peace 
process, as they could not be perceived to be 
opposed to the long-awaited peace (Young 
2006). Political power-sharing granted these 
groups a share of the new political dispen-
sation in the South, while military integra-
tion made the forcible disarmament of OAGs 
largely unnecessary.
Means & Modalities of Military 
Integration in South Sudan
In South Sudan, the Office of the President 
and the Ministry for National Security initi-
ated the military integration process, mak-
ing the political decision to offer amnesty to 
armed group commanders and negotiating 
the terms of the integration deals.9 The cur-
rency of these negotiations took the form of 
military promotions, government appoint-
ments, cash, cars, houses, accommodation 
during the integration period, and promises 
of regular salaries once forces were inte-
grated (McEvoy and LeBrun 2010).10 The type 
of amnesty and integration package leaders 
of armed groups would receive was con-
tingent on their specific ‘threat potential,’ 
which could be understood in terms of com-
manders’ ability to secure external funding 
or to mobilize fighters (Lacher 2012).11
While the CPA’s Protocol on Security 
Arrangements and Permanent Ceasefire 
and Security Arrangements Implementation 
Modalities and Appendices included speci-
fications for integration between the SAF 
and the SPLA, it did not articulate the means 
and modalities to drive a military integra-
tion process among armed groups in South 
Sudan (CPA 2003; CPA 2004). The Juba 
Declaration, which formalized military inte-
gration in South Sudan, in theory articulated 
how the process would be implemented. 
SSDF Chief of Staff, the late Paulino Matiep, 
would assume the figurehead post of Deputy 
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Commander-in-Chief of the SPLA and, in 
consultation with Kiir as Commander-in-
Chief, a High Political Committee would be 
created to oversee the implementation of the 
agreement. A Military Technical Committee 
was to be established, reporting to the High 
Political Committee, to handle the integra-
tion of the SSDF into the command struc-
tures and component units of the SPLA, 
harmonize ranks, deploy forces, and handle 
issues of demobilization and downsizing in 
accordance with the provisions of the CPA. 
Finally, an Administrative and Civil Service 
Committee was to be established to deal 
with the integration of the SSDF’s non-mil-
itary personnel into national and state gov-
ernment (GRSS 2006).
As there was no standing committee to 
manage South Sudan’s subsequent inte-
gration processes, each of the committees 
established for the integration of various 
armed groups may have been different in 
their execution of the process.12 Nonetheless, 
once negotiations with armed groups were 
concluded, the integration process generally 
had four stages:
First, the President issued a directive to 
the SPLA’s Chief of General Staff to convene 
a committee charged with integrating an 
armed group into the SPLA.13 Once the com-
mittee had been selected from the SPLA and 
the leadership of the integrating forces, the 
President signed off on its composition.14 The 
Chief of General Staff then issued guidance 
to the committee on how the integration 
process should be executed, including rank 
adjustments, age and education require-
ments for integration, the limits on the num-
ber of soldiers accepted into the SPLA and 
other organized forces, budget and logistics 
for the movement of forces, and where to 
send those deemed unfit for service.15 The 
committee itself would also begin to set out 
the budget and timelines for the integration 
process, as well as determine the screening 
requirements for integration into the SPLA.16
Second, the leaders of the armed groups 
would submit lists of forces to be integrated 
into the SPLA and the committee would 
visit assembly sites to verify the parades of 
integrating forces.17 During the integra-
tion process, the SPLA was responsible for 
housing and feeding armed groups as they 
awaited integration.18 While these forces did 
not receive salaries, some were apparently 
given money and other tokens to demon-
strate that the government was committed 
to integration.19
Third, the integration committee would 
interview members of the armed groups at 
their cantonment sites in order to determine 
their placements.20 Often, due to time con-
straints, only officers would be interviewed 
by the committee while the remainder of 
the soldiers would just be checked for their 
physical fitness.21 Those who were inter-
viewed were asked their preference for which 
organized service (SPLA, South Sudan Police 
Service, Prisons, or Fire Brigade) they wished 
to join but due to the size restrictions of 
these services sometimes they had to be per-
suaded to pursue one track over the others.22 
During this stage, the committee would also 
screen integrating forces to determine their 
physical fitness and ascertain where they 
should be placed in the organized services or 
whether they should go to the civil service or 
through the DDR program.23 The committee 
was then responsible for negotiating which 
of the integrating forces would be officers in 
the organized forces and which would not, 
but the ultimate decision is determined by 
the SPLA members of the committee.24 Due 
to the continual cycle of integrations, after 
the initial round of post-Juba Declaration 
integrations the criteria for rank assign-
ment was changed so that it would account 
for integrating forces having the appropri-
ate number of officers per formation.25 For 
example, an armed group integrating with 
500 combatants would hypothetically be 
entitled to a Colonel with a Lieutenant 
Colonel as a deputy, while an armed group 
integrating with 3,000 combatants would be 
entitled to a Brigadier General with a Colonel 
as a deputy.26 Yet in spite of the required 
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officer-to-soldier ratios for integrating forces, 
the President could still alter rank allocations 
during the subsequent stage of integration 
in an attempt to encourage the armed group 
leaders’ compliance with the process.27
Finally, the integration committee would 
submit a list of recommendations to the 
SPLA Chief of General Staff with the integrat-
ing forces’ names, ages, previous ranks, edu-
cation, training, proposed ranks, and remarks 
on prospective assignments (i.e., infantry, 
signal corps, engineering corps, police 
force).28 For final approval, this integration 
report was sent to the President, who would 
then make alterations to rank assignments if 
he saw fit before issuing a decree announc-
ing the outcomes of the integration to SPLA 
units.29 At this point, the committee’s work 
would be complete and it would then fall to 
the SPLA Deputy Chiefs of General Staff for 
Administration, Training, and Operations to 
calculate the salaries of integrating forces, 
arrange their transport to training centers, 
and assign them for deployment across vari-
ous SPLA Divisions.30 Although the work of 
the integration committee had been com-
pleted, the SPLA had no metrics to indicate 
when members of an armed group could be 
deemed ‘integrated’.31
The decision to pursue an open-ended 
military integration process was a politi-
cal one. Accordingly, some SPLA officers 
believed they had not been sufficiently con-
sulted as to the wisdom of integration, and 
thus had little ownership of the process.32 
Throughout the process, some officers main-
tained reservations that integration was 
compromising the strength and cohesion of 
the military and was therefore not serving 
the interests of the SPLA.33 Military integra-
tion was costly and the SPLA was concerned 
that too much money was being spent on 
salaries at the expense of operations and 
transformation.34 With the government 
spending almost 50 percent of its budget 
on the SPLA and the Ministry of Defense 
and Veterans Affairs (of which over 80 per-
cent went to salaries), the opportunity cost 
of this expenditure was investment in mili-
tary professionalization (Snowden 2012).35 
Moreover, some of the SPLA senior leader-
ship was opposed to the President’s decision 
to bring armed groups into the military due 
to what they perceived to be the relatively 
low quality of such forces, amid concerns 
that integrating forces would eventually 
betray the SPLA.36 Integration had essen-
tially overtaken recruitment, which pre-
cluded the force from bringing in qualified 
soldiers who may have been younger, more 
physically fit, and devoid of the baggage of 
past defections.37 Finally, the SPLA believed 
that integration should have been done 
according to SPLA rules and regulations – 
with the appropriate number of officers per 
military formation – rather than allowing 
the Commander-in-Chief to manipulate the 
SPLA integration committees’ rank alloca-
tions and increase the ranks of armed group 
leaders in order to make peace.38 
Regardless, the aforementioned trade-
offs the government made in order to ‘buy 
peace’ in the immediate aftermath of the 
CPA were worthwhile, as military integration 
succeeded in averting large-scale conflict 
between the government of South Sudan 
and the OAGs in the period that immediately 
followed the CPA.39 However, the flawed 
implementation of the integration process 
affected its success as a long-term stabiliza-
tion measure and eventually contributed to 
its disintegration in 2013.
Concurrent Defense Sector Reform
In order to understand the role that military 
integration played in South Sudan’s transi-
tion from war to peace, it is important to 
understand the context in which integration 
was occurring. Concurrent to the process of 
bringing disparate groups under the banner 
of the SPLA, South Sudan was undergoing 
a process of defense sector transformation, 
which included reducing the size of the mili-
tary from a force of up to 230,000 down to 
one of 120,000,40 and transforming the SPLA 
from a guerrilla force. 
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Written in anticipation of the military’s 
post-independence strategic challenges, the 
2008 SPLA White Paper on Defense articu-
lated the need for the SPLA to transform into 
a professional, conventional, modern mili-
tary, while consuming a declining proportion 
of the national expenditure budget over time 
(SPLA 2011a). Transformation, however, was 
contingent on the SPLA’s ability to undertake 
a sizeable reduction in force, as the presence 
of non-essential personnel was both a con-
straint on the force’s operational capabilities 
and a drain on its resources (SPLA 2011a).
During the Interim Period, a handful of 
initiatives were conceptualized to reduce the 
size of the SPLA. One such initiative involved 
reforming the Wounded Heroes program to 
deliver benefits to those who had sustained 
injuries during the civil war so that the exist-
ing program would cease being a dumping 
ground for able-bodied personnel deemed 
non-essential to the military.41 Another ini-
tiative involved the creation of notional civil 
works brigades so that the military’s excess 
manpower could contribute to the develop-
ment of the country’s infrastructure. Under 
this hypothetical program, 50,000 able-bod-
ied former combatants were to be trained in 
specialized, income-generating skills such as 
agriculture, carpentry, construction, livestock 
management, mining, petroleum, plumbing, 
and river dredging (Sudan Tribune 2012a; 
Sudan Tribune 2012b). The government also 
considered the establishment of a Pensions 
program to gradually age out soldiers of 
retirement age; however this plan was held 
up by the need for actuarial analyses that 
would help determine the affordability of the 
program, given the actual size of the SPLA.42
A majority of the excess manpower of the 
SPLA, however, was to go through the DDR 
process, which had been unsuccessfully 
attempted in 2009 and 2012. Originally man-
dated by the CPA’s Agreement on Permanent 
Ceasefire and Security Arrangements, both 
the SPLA and the SAF were to send 90,000 
soldiers each through the DDR process dur-
ing the Interim Period of the CPA (CPA 2004). 
However, DDR Phase I was largely regarded 
as a failure, as only 12,525 individuals out 
of the SPLA’s original caseload entered the 
program (Nichols 2011). DDR Phase II, which 
had an ambitious caseload of 150,000, like-
wise failed to get off the ground due to the 
2012 oil shutdown and subsequent auster-
ity measures, border skirmishes with Sudan, 
and disagreements with the donor commu-
nity as to the execution of the process. As a 
result, DDR did not play a significant role in 
rightsizing the SPLA or in its transformation 
(Rands 2010).
In 2011, the SPLA Chief of General 
Staff signed additional strategic guid-
ance – Objective Force 2017 and the 
Transformation Programme 2012-2017. The 
purpose behind Objective Force 2017 and 
the Transformation Programme 2012-2017 
was to guide the development of the SPLA 
between 2012 and 2017, inform national 
security/defense policy implementation, 
and help prioritize and provide a frame-
work for security assistance to be provided 
by foreign donors (Emmanuel 2014). SPLA 
Transformation thus involved four major 
activities: enhancing operational capabili-
ties, education and training of SPLA person-
nel, improving SPLA values and standards, 
and rightsizing the parade of the SPLA to 
120,000, per the force requirements articu-
lated in these documents (SPLA 2011b).
Having recognized the need to develop a 
cohesive military with national character, the 
SPLA sought to transform infantry battalions 
through a standardized ‘Reset’ program of 
instruction at one of three training cent-
ers in Mapel, Pariak, and Owinykibul (SPLA 
2013). Through this Reset, SPLA units would 
be screened over the course of three to five 
months to ensure soldiers were fit for service 
and be oriented with the SPLA Act, Rules and 
Regulations, and the Rule of Law, thereby 
addressing the military’s ballooning parade 
and enhancing its warfighting capabilities 
(SPLA 2013). When the civil war broke out 
in December 2013, plans to ‘reset’ the force 
were being finalized.
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Design Flaws in South Sudan’s 
Military Integration Process
The successful implementation of military 
integration within five years of the termi-
nation of a conflict is believed to increase 
the prospects for lasting peace (Hoddie and 
Hartzell 2003). Yet, as military integration 
is implemented concurrent to other peace-
building measures, it is difficult to isolate its 
specific effects in order to determine the suc-
cess or failure of the process (Glassmyer and 
Sambanis 2008; Krebs 2014). Nonetheless, 
the structure of military integration is 
believed to hold the key to the successful 
implementation of the process, as some 
integration agreements fail because they are 
poorly structured and not fully implemented 
(Glassmyer and Sambanis 2008). The flaws in 
the design of the military integration process 
in South Sudan will be discussed in addi-
tional detail in the following paragraphs.
Integration overlooked in foreign 
assistance
Many states are weak in the immediate after-
math of conflict and integration can be a 
costly, technically demanding, and turbulent 
process. In this context, third party actors can 
act as mediators during peace negotiations; 
as providers of financial or logistical assis-
tance; as guarantors of security in the form of 
peacekeepers or a ceasefire monitoring force; 
or to provide teams of trainers to increase the 
professionalization of integrated forces so 
they may eventually qualify for senior ranks 
in the reconstituted military (Glassmyer and 
Sambanis 2008; Hoddie and Hartzell 2003; 
Burgess 2008; Hall 2009; Licklider 2014). 
The government of South Sudan did not 
ask for, nor was it offered significant foreign 
assistance for the negotiation, cantonment, 
and verification of parade, fitness screening, 
rank assignment, and division assignment 
that were part of the integration process.43 
There are several explanations for why this 
was the case. Prior to 2007, there was a gap 
in foreign engagement with the SPLA and 
many decisions had already been made with 
regard to the security sector, which set the 
course for the foreign engagement that fol-
lowed.44 By this time, post-Juba Declaration 
integrations were underway and it is possible 
that neither the government nor the interna-
tional community believed that the process 
warranted external assistance. Moreover, 
while the donor community had pushed the 
concept of military integration between the 
North and South in terms of the JIUs, South 
Sudan’s status as an autonomous and not 
yet independent region prior to 2011 made 
it awkward for international donors to get 
involved in the SPLA’s military integration 
process – lest they be accused of implicitly 
supporting the dismemberment of Sudan.45 
Alternatively, both the South Sudanese and 
the international community may have 
seen integration as a purely internal mili-
tary affair, or the process may have been too 
expensive for the international community 
to fund from start to finish.46
Aspects of the military integration process 
received limited support from the UN. The 
United Nations Mission in Sudan (UNMIS) 
and its successor, the United Nations Mission 
in South Sudan (UNMISS), provided logistical 
assistance for some of the ceasefire negotia-
tions with the late George Athor and dur-
ing David Yau Yau’s first rebellion during 
the 2010–2011 time period. However, due 
to its inability to stem the tide of commu-
nal violence across much of South Sudan 
during the Interim Period, as well as in the 
aftermath of independence, the UN mis-
sions were unwilling or unable to assume 
roles as guarantors of security between the 
government and armed groups during the 
amnesty and integration process. Rather, the 
focus for the UN missions was on establish-
ing rule of law, strengthening the security 
and justice sectors, offering training on small 
arms management, and managing the DDR 
process between Sudan and southern Sudan, 
and eventually within an independent South 
Sudan (UNMISS 2013; UNSC 2013a; UNSC 
2013b; UNSC 2013c; UNSC 2012).47 Even 
when parts of the SPLA did receive foreign 
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security assistance, it was not specifically 
directed towards assisting with the integra-
tion process. Instead, for leading contribu-
tors to developing South Sudan’s security 
sector, like the United States and United 
Kingdom, the focus was on transformation 
of the SPLA.48
While foreign assistance may generally be 
helpful in the implementation of a military 
integration process, it may also be insuf-
ficient to prevent failure (Licklider 2014). 
Yet, in light of the concurrent post-CPA chal-
lenges, foreign support for integration could 
have facilitated the implementation of the 
process in South Sudan. Instead, despite for-
eign engagement in parts of South Sudan’s 
security sector – from mediating ceasefires 
to DDR to SPLA Transformation – there was 
limited foreign support to the military inte-
gration process. Consequently, efforts by 
the international community to transform 
South Sudan’s security sector were built on 
the unsound foundation of a fragmented 
military.
Open-ended structure without 
accountability
Despite the benefits that military integra-
tion can provide during war to peace transi-
tions, the process is a political quick fix that 
runs the risk of creating a ‘demonstration 
effect’, showing that violence and disobedi-
ence can be translated into benefits (Baaz 
and Verweijen 2013). In South Sudan, the 
government’s response to the armed groups 
that proliferated during the April 2010 elec-
tions demonstrated its continuing post-Juba 
Declaration commitment to use military 
integration to address armed opposition. 
As a result, the military integration process 
became de facto open-ended.
During the candidate selection process that 
preceded the elections for the presidency, 
the legislative assembly, governorships, and 
state assemblies, the SPLM was accused of 
handpicking parliamentary and gubernato-
rial candidates who had not been chosen by 
the people residing in various constituencies. 
During the elections themselves, there were 
also allegations of fraudulent and exclusion-
ary practices, and of intimidation and vote-
rigging (ICG 2011; LeRiche and Arnold 2012). 
Some candidates that had been unsuccessful 
at the ballot box began armed rebellions 
against the government in the aftermath of 
their defeat. Although some of these armed 
group leaders were motivated by oppor-
tunism and greed, others, such as the late 
Lieutenant General George Athor, the late 
Colonel Gatluak Gai, and David Yau Yau also 
had grievances directly linked to their elec-
toral failures. By the end of 2011, the gov-
ernment was able to neutralize these armed 
groups through a combination of co-option 
and coercion, and many of their leaders had 
either been killed, placed under house arrest, 
or were in the process of responding to the 
government’s offers of amnesty.
However, the amnesty and integration 
processes that followed these rebellions 
were open-ended and there were no cred-
ible disincentives for repeat defections. 
Accordingly, the costs associated with mili-
tary integration remained low, while the 
potential rewards for repeat defection (i.e., 
financial benefits, impunity for past crimes, 
high ranks, good positions, and lucrative 
deployment locations) were persistently 
quite high. Knowing how much the govern-
ment was willing to compromise for the 
sake of stability, armed group leaders could 
continually use force or the threat of vio-
lence as an instrument of bargaining, as a 
means of resolving political grievances, and 
as a way to forestall compliance with inte-
gration and remain deployed in their home 
areas (Young 2012; Rands 2010; Small Arms 
Survey 2008b). This open-ended defection-
reintegration cycle, also described by De 
Waal (2014) as ‘rent-seeking rebellion,’ cre-
ated a perverse incentive for members of 
the SPLA to defect in order to advance their 
positions or increase their wealth.
In addition, the lack of ethnic or regional 
quotas in the integration process created a 
loophole whereby the ethnic composition 
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of the force did not match the country’s 
demography. With only 16 percent of South 
Sudan’s population, members of the Nuer 
ethnic group were believed to comprise 
65 – 70 percent of the SPLA by the time 
the civil war broke out in South Sudan (CIA 
World Factbook 2015; ICG 2014). This was 
due to both the integration of OAGs that had 
been predominantly Nuer following the Juba 
Declaration and the open-ended integration 
of the mainly Nuer armed groups operat-
ing across Greater Upper Nile from 2010 
onwards. Accordingly, this approach resulted 
in a numerical imbalance in favor of the Nuer 
in the SPLA, which contributed to a sense 
that the SPLA lacked national character and 
diversity (AU 2014; The Sudd Institute 2014).
Ineffective rightsizing efforts 
With a dearth of alternative livelihoods in 
the midst of war to peace transitions, former 
combatants have economic incentives to 
seek benefits from integration into a statu-
tory security framework or reintegration into 
civilian life. Containing former combatants 
in transitional security mechanisms such 
as military integration and civilian reinte-
gration programs can often buy time for 
political and economic development and 
help prevent the resumption of armed con-
flict (Colletta 2012). The problem, however, 
is when either of these mechanisms fails to 
provide a ‘release valve’ for the security sec-
tor and the system becomes overwhelmed 
trying to accommodate armed groups. In the 
case of South Sudan, the process for bringing 
armed groups into the SPLA through military 
integration outpaced the SPLA’s efforts to 
reduce the size of the military.
Efforts to rightsize the SPLA should have 
reduced the cost the SPLA imposed on 
South Sudan’s budget and allowed the SPLA 
to focus on transformation. However, efforts 
to demobilize ex-combatants and reform the 
security sector fell victim to several security 
dilemmas. Due to the ever-present threat 
of renewed north-south violence and ‘ene-
mies of the peace’ within South Sudan, the 
government was reluctant to undertake the 
required reduction in force. Furthermore, 
after decades of marginalization and con-
flict, the southern economy did not provide 
alternative livelihoods that could absorb the 
soldiers that the SPLA needed to demobilize 
and the government was wary of the threats 
that unemployed ex-combatants would pre-
sent to sustained peace. With South Sudan’s 
postwar economy providing limited liveli-
hoods for demobilized soldiers, there was 
a fear that soldiers were being reintegrated 
into poverty and that the government and 
the donor community had not managed 
expectations vis-à-vis civilian life as an 
alternative to the SPLA.49 This was exacer-
bated by the inability of civilian reintegra-
tion initiatives to compete economically 
with the level of pay in the security forces, 
particularly given the decision to pay the 
SPLA after the CPA was signed.50 While the 
one-time DDR reinsertion grant was the 
equivalent of USD 360, the South Sudan 
Legislative Assembly voted to double the 
SPLA’s salaries to USD 150/month shortly 
after the Juba Declaration, and later raised it 
to USD 220/month by the time of the 2011 
referendum (De Waal 2014; Rands 2010). 
Thus, the government’s open-door amnesty 
and integration policy combined with inef-
fective demobilization initiatives increased 
pressure on the military integration process 
to address the actual and potential threats 
posed by armed groups.51
Development of Parallel Security 
Structures
In 2012, during a tense period in Sudan-
South Sudan relations, General Paul Malong 
Awan, the former governor of Northern 
Bahr al-Ghazal state, reportedly assembled a 
militia referred to as ‘Mathiang Anyoor’ (AU 
2014).52 This armed group fought against the 
SAF in the disputed border area of Heglig/
Panthou in 2012 (Pendle 2015).
From the Mathiang Anyoor, as well as 
from cattle protection titweng forces from 
President Kiir’s home region of Greater 
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Bahr al Ghazal, a predominately Dinka 
security force was established and referred 
to by a Dinka phrase ‘Dut ku Beny’, which 
reportedly translates to mean ‘Protector 
of the Boss’ (Pendle 2015; Radio Tamazuj 
2015). The ethnic and regional composi-
tion of these forces may have indicated a 
lack in confidence on the part of the rul-
ing elite towards what was suspected to be 
the Nuer-dominated composition of the 
SPLA and its ability to protect their interests 
(AU 2014; Panel of Experts on South Sudan 
2015). Malong, who replaced SPLA Chief 
of General Staff James Hoth Mai in April 
2014, subsequently denied complicity with 
establishing this group, stating that ‘no one 
can recruit an army apart from the national 
army’ (Radio Tamazuj 2015). Adding to the 
tense political environment that had been 
building up prior to the outbreak of conflict 
in December 2013, there was concern that 
these new recruits essentially operated out-
side the formal military command (Johnson 
2014; African Union Commission of Inquiry 
2014). Organized entirely outside the 
Ministry of Defense and the SPLA’s General 
Staff, these forces reported directly to the 
President and accordingly received support 
for salaries, training, and equipment directly 
out of the Office of the President, as the 
Ministry of Defense refused to fund them 
(ICG 2014; Radio Tamazuj 2015). A majority 
of these forces were not integrated into the 
SPLA although a few were eventually inte-
grated into the 3000 soldier Tiger Battalion 
(Presidential Guard). The Presidential Guard, 
which was composed of troops loyal to vari-
ous figures, including President Kiir, former 
Vice President Machar, and the late Paulino 
Matip, had previously been an example 
of integrating Dinka, Nuer, and other eth-
nic groups into a functional unit (Sudan 
Tribune 2013). 
The parallel forces were reportedly trained 
at the Pantiit Military Training Center in 
Northern Bahr al Ghazal and subsequently 
transferred to Luri, approximately 16 miles 
west of the capital (Radio Tamazuj 2015). 
Between 300 and 700 personnel were then 
transferred to Juba to be integrated into the 
Presidential Guard in the days immediately 
before the meeting of the National Liberation 
Council in mid-December (Panel of Experts 
on South Sudan 2015; Young 2015; AU 2014; 
Radio Tamazuj 2015). Some of these forces 
were allegedly involved in the killing of Nuer 
civilians in Juba between December 16 and 
18, 2013 (Mamdani 2014). Bringing this new 
parallel security force into the Presidential 
Guard was seen by some as a betrayal of the 
force’s multi-ethnic ideal, which had been 
one of the aims of the integration process 
(ICG 2014).
Conclusions
Military integration in South Sudan, formal-
ized after the Juba Declaration, followed the 
SPLA’s decades-long tradition of bringing 
armed groups into the fold and contributed 
to stability during the Interim Period of the 
CPA. For some period of time, military inte-
gration suited the equities of the govern-
ment: the process allowed South Sudan to 
secure southern unity in preparation for the 
referendum on independence, allowed the 
government to outbid Khartoum’s support 
to armed groups in the South, and demon-
strated the government’s conciliatory intent 
to bring armed opposition into the fold. 
With both legal and practical imperatives to 
address the threat posed by non-SPLA armed 
groups, the other alternatives – to fight or 
ignore armed groups – were not realistic 
during the period that immediately followed 
signing of the peace agreement. 
Yet, considering the competing imperatives 
of the post-CPA period, military integration 
in South Sudan occurred in a challenging 
context. Due to the concurrent state-building 
tasks South Sudan was undertaking, and the 
persistent threat of return to war with Sudan, 
the country lacked the bandwidth, technical 
expertise, finances, and logistics to be able to 
design a more functional military integration 
process. In this context, the military inte-
gration process outpaced the institutional 
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growth of the SPLA and its thinking on how 
to address armed groups.53
While foreign assistance to South Sudan’s 
integration process could have facilitated 
implementation, it may not have been suf-
ficient to overcome the challenging context 
in which integration was being conducted. 
Rather than focusing on military integra-
tion as a building block for the consolida-
tion of the SPLA, such assistance to South 
Sudan’s security sector was limited to DDR 
and SPLA Transformation. Consequently, 
the SPLA was established on an unstable 
foundation.
The ethnic composition of the SPLA that 
resulted from an open-ended integration 
process without quotas did little to assuage 
fears that the equities of President Kiir’s Bahr 
al-Ghazal political circle could be protected 
by the SPLA. This may have contributed to 
the recruitment of parallel security forces 
primarily from the Bahr al-Ghazal region 
starting in 2012. In turn, the establishment 
of regionalized and ethnicized parallel secu-
rity structures undermined the premise of 
military integration as an insurance policy 
for integrated forces. Going outside the 
SPLA chain of command in the pursuit of 
ethnically loyal forces further undermined 
attempts at defense sector transformation, 
and undermined the notion of cohesion in 
the establishment of a professional national 
military.
The open-ended nature of integration cre-
ated incentives for defection from the SPLA. 
The demonstration effect from the 2010 
elections – that political failures and armed 
violence could be transformed into rewards 
when the government inevitably bought 
off armed group leaders – helped create 
a class of rebel entrepreneurs who ben-
efitted from a lack of accountability within 
what became an open-ended integration 
process. Moreover, open-ended integration 
counteracted concurrent efforts to demobi-
lize former combatants and prevented the 
SPLA from ‘graduating’ from the integra-
tion process and making progress towards 
professionalization. Compounding the 
implementation of this process, DDR and 
other civilian reintegration initiatives failed 
to get off the ground, increasing pressure 
on the military integration to address the 
threats posed by armed groups. As a result, 
integration outpaced demobilization initia-
tives, leading to the former process becom-
ing overburdened as a means to address the 
threat of armed groups.
While the integration process itself was 
not responsible for setting off the politi-
cal impasses that reached a boiling point in 
2013, the acceleration of the conflict may 
be attributed to the fact that the national 
military was being built on a destabilized 
foundation. Due to the design flaws of South 
Sudan’s military integration process, the 
SPLA was in a state of arrested development, 
which handicapped its efforts to transform 
into a more professional military force that 
could have been less prone to fragmentation 
in the face of political instability. The integra-
tion of armed groups into the SPLA should 
have been a short-term quick fix and a means 
by which to move beyond civil war-era divi-
sions; instead, the military integration pro-
cess became an end in and of itself.
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